The Federal Aviation Administration’s August 2025 proposal to normalize routine beyond-visual-line-of-sight operations crystallized a dispute that has been simmering since the BVLOS Aviation Rulemaking Committee issued its final report in 2022. At the heart of the debate is a simple legal and operational question: who yields when a manned aircraft and an unmanned aircraft converge at low altitude? The FAA’s proposal would establish new Part 108 rules for BVLOS UAS and, in many low-altitude environments outside certain controlled airspace or airport approaches, condition right-of-way in part on whether the crewed aircraft is broadcasting position information.
The proposal reflects the ARC’s earlier recommendations that sought a performance-based path to scale BVLOS missions while managing risk. The ARC explicitly recommended a right-of-way regime that gives priority in some low-altitude contexts to uncrewed aircraft unless crewed aircraft are broadcasting ADS-B or other approved electronic conspicuity signals. Those same ARC recommendations also emphasize detect-and-avoid capabilities and a concept of well-clear for UAS.
That sounds technical. In practice it raises three related concerns for manned aviation stakeholders. First, many low-altitude crewed operations are routine and safety-critical: agricultural applicators, emergency medical helicopters, firefighting craft, and sport and recreational aviators often operate where BVLOS drones will fly. Second, a right-of-way rule tied to broadcasting equipment shifts responsibility onto human pilots to carry or operate specific avionics to assert priority, a change from the long-standing maneuverability-based rules that prioritize avoidance by the more maneuverable vehicle. Third, the effectiveness of any traffic deconfliction scheme depends on detection technologies that work reliably against both cooperative and non-cooperative targets. Groups representing general aviation have been outspoken about these risks and the perceived inequity of equipment-based right-of-way.
Technically, the FAA proposal and ARC work approach these problems along several axes rather than with a single blunt instrument. The rulemaking package ties operational permissions to a combination of mitigations: detect-and-avoid systems, networked traffic information, boundaries defined for operations, requirements for operations to remain at or below 400 feet in approved zones, and potential standards for low-cost electronic conspicuity devices so some formerly non-cooperative aircraft can become visible to UAS systems. The intent is to create an ecosystem where UAS can reliably detect either a broadcast position signal or the presence of a non-cooperative aircraft through onboard or ground-based sensors.
But policy intent does not automatically equal operational safety. Detect-and-avoid technologies tested to date include radar, electro-optical and IR cameras, acoustic sensors, and networks of ground sensors. Each modality has trade-offs in cost, size, false alarm rate, and effectiveness in complex terrain or weather. Relying on ADS-B or nascent portable electronic conspicuity devices to preserve manned right-of-way leaves a coverage gap: some aircraft cannot practically equip with these systems, and broadcasts can be unreliable at low altitude or masked by terrain or structures. The result could be scenarios in which an unmanned system claims right-of-way because a crewed aircraft is technically non-broadcasting yet is actively operating at low altitude in a way that makes avoidance by an automated system difficult.
These realities suggest a set of policy and technical guardrails that would make any shift in right-of-way both safer and more equitable. First, phase-in rights and obligations rather than flip a large-scale swap overnight. Early BVLOS approvals should prioritize well-instrumented corridors and operations with demonstrable, certified detect-and-avoid capability or where robust ground-based sensing reduces uncertainty. Second, require rigorous performance standards for DAA systems that explicitly include detection of low-signature and non-cooperative aircraft in cluttered, low-altitude environments. Those standards should be technology-agnostic but measurable, with third-party validation and clear failure-mode analysis. The ARC’s emphasis on measurable risk tolerances and qualification processes aligns with this approach.
Third, avoid an unfunded mandate on general aviation while ensuring minimum practical conspicuity. If right-of-way is conditioned on broadcasting, regulators should both set realistic technical standards for portable EC devices and provide transition policies that account for the many aircraft that cannot easily carry them. Policymakers should also avoid creating perverse incentives where pilots avoid certain equipped areas to preserve legacy operational flexibility. Fourth, expand and fund airspace awareness tools that do not rely solely on airborne equipage: ground sensors, temporary aerial surveillance during major operations, and integration with local air traffic services can provide layered situational awareness.
Finally, governance matters. Right-of-way is a legal and cultural norm rooted in pilot responsibility, see-and-avoid practice, and airspace management. Any reallocation of responsibilities must be accompanied by clear rules of the road, training for both UAS operators and crewed pilots about the new operational model, and a robust incident reporting and feedback loop to refine standards. The BVLOS ARC foresaw many of these needs in its recommendations on operator qualifications, performance-based standards, and public-interest considerations. The FAA’s NPRM is a starting point for that iterative process, not its conclusion.
The manned versus unmanned right-of-way debate is often framed as a binary choice between innovation and safety. It is neither. It is a systems engineering and policy problem that requires calibrated mitigation, credible certification of sensing and avoidance, fair allocation of cost and responsibility, and a staged rollout that privileges demonstrable safety over expediency. If regulators, industry, and the broader aviation community can agree on those principles, BVLOS integration can proceed without upending the practical realities that keep people and rescue operations safe in low altitude airspace. If they cannot, friction and mistrust will slow adoption and raise real risk for both crews and communities below the flight paths.